

REVIEW ARTICLE

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

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THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. By RUSSELL MEIGGS. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1972. Pp. 620.

DIE HERRSCHAFT DER ATHENER IM ERSTEN ATTISCHEN SEEBUND. By WOLFGANG SCHULLER. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 1974. Pp. 233.

THE HISTORIAN of the Athenian empire should explain why it arose, why it operated as it did, and why it failed. It is not an easy task. The sources for the origin and development of empire in the Pentekontaetia are meagre and unsatisfactory, the contemporary inscriptions which show its operation are fragmentary and difficult to date, and the idiosyncratic views of Thucydides impede a proper account of its failure.

The major difficulty in the Pentekontaetia is with chronology. Meiggs starts from the inscriptions. From 454/3 onwards the quota lists of the first two stelai provide precise annual information. If cities do not pay, disaffection or open revolt is presumed, e.g., among the islanders from 454 to 450, or more generally in 447. Reductions in tribute are used to date the establishment of cleruchies attested by literary sources, e.g., in Andros, Naxos, and Euboea in 450 and in the Chersonese in 447. The letter forms of important, but undated, inscriptions are compared with those of the quota lists and similar dated accounts to secure their dating before 445.¹ Further comparison with individual quota records enables greater individual precision with, e.g., the Erythrae Decree (Meiggs-Lewis 40) in 453/2 and the Colophon Decree (Meiggs-Lewis 47) in 447/6. The decree to build the temple of Athena Nike (Meiggs-Lewis 44),

¹Cf. R. Meiggs, "The Dating of Fifth-Century Attic Inscriptions," *JHS* 86 (1966) 86-98, esp. 92, Table 1. The evidence collected by Meiggs, which shows no three-barred sigma on definitely dated inscriptions after 445, is impressive. It would, however, be considerably weakened by even a single dated inscription after 445 with three-barred sigmas and other 'early' letter forms. T. E. Wick, "A Note on the Date of the Athenian-Egestan Alliance," *JHS* 95 (1975) 186-190, has given reasons for believing that *IG* 1² 19 constitutes one such inscription. Another example, *IG* 1² 22 = B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (Cambridge, Mass., Princeton, 1939-1953), hereafter *ATL*, Vol. 2, D 11, is dated in or after the archonship of Euthynus. This should mean in or after 426/5 (see below, 250), but most historians have been prepared to save epigraphical orthodoxy by supposing an earlier Euthynus behind Diodorus' Euthydemus in 450/49 (Diod. 12.3.1).

formally before 445, is brought into connection with the presumed "missing list" of 448, and it is suggested that all the tribute was then given to Athena for the temple; the decree is accordingly dated by implication to 449/8. Between this and the earlier peace with Persia celebrated by the temple are assigned, with varying degrees of confidence, the Papyrus Decree² and Pericles' Congress Decree (Plut. *Per.* 17) to 450/49, the Peace of Callias itself to 450, and Cimon's Cyprus expedition to 451. After 449/8 come the Coinage Decree (Meiggs-Lewis 45) ca 448 and the Clinias Decree (Meiggs-Lewis 46) in 447. Within the period thus defined (ca 453-447) two proxyeny decrees (*IG* 1² 27, 28a), again formally before 445, add the language of empire (*IG* 1² 27, lines 14 f., ἐν [τὸν πόλεον ὅσον Ἀθῆναισι] κρατοῦσι) to the already attested imposition of garrisons (Meiggs-Lewis 40, lines 14-15), visiting and resident Athenian officials (Meiggs-Lewis 40, line 13; Meiggs-Lewis 45, paras 1, 3, 4; Meiggs-Lewis 46, lines 6-7), democracy (Meiggs-Lewis 40, lines 9 f.; Meiggs-Lewis 47, lines 42 f.), and colonial status (Meiggs-Lewis 46, lines 41-43). The reconstructed crisis ends with the independently dated commencement of the Parthenon in 447/6 (Meiggs-Lewis 59) as a symbol of the new order.

Around this hypothetical, but familiar core Meiggs constructs in fascinating detail the rest of his book. Before 454 he traces the early movement from alliance to empire with the discovery and removal of Theseus' bones to Athens in the 470s, the allied conversion from ships to tribute and Athenian action against Thasos in the 460s, and in the early 450s the presence of allied contingents in the first Peloponnesian War. But it is the simple accident of massive failure in Egypt in 454 which precipitates the transfer of the allied treasury to Athens, with consequent revolts and the empire emerging from their suppression. By the end of the crisis in 447 it is an empire already established in all its essentials that survives the further revolts of Euboea in 446 and of Samos in 440, provokes war with the free Greek world in 431, and is finally defeated in 404. The fifth century is thus truly made to pivot around its centre with the general and systematic intrusion into allied autonomy, which was for Meiggs in the end responsible for the empire's failure, already a fact before even the Parthenon was begun.

Meiggs is well aware that other views are possible. Thucydides in his account of how the empire was established (1.97.2, τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει ἐν οἷῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη) notoriously does not even mention the transference of the treasury or the Peace of Callias. His account of Athenian vacillation concerning alliance with Corcyra in 433 (1.44.1) accords badly

²Strasbourg Papyrus Graeca 84 (= *Anonymus Argentinensis*), see B. D. Meritt and H. T. Wade-Gery, "Athenian Resources in 449 and 431 B.C.," *Hesperia* 26 (1957) 163-197.

with the supposition of serious preparation already in 434 for an evacuation of Attica as entailed by Meiggs' dating of the Callias Decrees (Meiggs-Lewis 58) to 434/3. And his view that Athenian failure followed the replacement of the disguised but rational "rule by the first man" with the real and irrational rule of the *demos* (2.65.9-11) and consequential *stasis* (2.65.12) cannot be made to agree with Meiggs' Herodotean location of the cause of failure in the very essence of empire itself. But it is not incumbent on the modern historian to agree with Thucydides. It seems clear that Thucydides wrote his Pentekontaetia excursus to defend the Athenian creation of empire against its critics. Thus his insistence that the Athenians had been offered, and had not sought, the hegemony in the 470s (1.95, *contra* Hdt. 8.3.2), that the Spartans had peacefully accepted the transfer (1.95.7, *contra* Diod. 11.50), that *phoros* had originally been a neutral, and not a pejorative, term derived from *phora* to describe a contribution to war against the Persians (1.96.1-2),³ that the treasury had originally been at Delos and not Athens (1.96.2), and that the office of Hellenotamiae had from the start been Athenian and had not been later misappropriated by them (1.96.2, *contra* Andoc. 3.38).⁴ A proper

³It is possible that originally the distinction between ship-providing and *phoros*-paying allies was more than one of convenience (cf. H. D. Meyer, "Vorgeschichte und Begründung des delisch-attischen Seebundes," *Historia* 12 [1963] 419) and that the imposition of *phoros* was restricted to those Greek states which had fought consistently on the Persian side in 480-479; cf. in general Hdt. 7.93-95; 8.22 with 8.85; Thuc. 6.82.3-83.2 and for the importance of the distinction at the time cf. Themistocles' action at Hdt. 8.111-112, esp., 112.2 διότι ἐμῆδισε and Miltiades' earlier justification of his Parian expedition, Hdt. 6.133. The payment of *phoros* would surely at the beginning have been reminiscent of the payment of *dasmos* to the Persians and so have implied inferior status; cf. O. Murray, "Ὁ 'ΑΡΧΑΙΟΣ ΔΑΣΜΟΣ," *Historia* 15 (1966) 150. Thus Thucydides shows his defensive attitude towards the origins of the Athenian *arche* precisely in his denial that *phoros* originally implied any such thing. I cannot believe with O. Murray, *art. cit.*, 150, that the word *phoros* was deliberately "first used in this connection" (i.e., as a non-pejorative alternative to *dasmos*) at the time of the formation of the Delian League in order to distinguish the new annual payment to the League from the old payment of *dasmos* to the Persians. It is far more likely that οὕτω γὰρ ὠνομάσθη τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά (Thuc. 1.96.2) represents a desperate attempt by Thucydides to deny, contrary to all probability, any negative connotation to the word at the time of its first use by the League.

⁴One cannot conclude from the numbered *archai* in the headings of the quota lists that the Hellenotamiae first became an Athenian board in 454/3, as was maintained by E. M. Walker in *The Cambridge Ancient History* 5 (Cambridge 1927) 46, but it is still difficult to believe that from the start when the allied treasury was still at Delos the Athenians alone elected and controlled its stewards; cf. A. G. Woodhead, "The Institution of the Hellenotamiae," *JHS* 79 (1959) 152. Yet this is what Thucydides' words imply, and they may well represent a rejoinder to those who after 404 criticized earlier Athenian imperialism and insisted on Athenian misappropriation of the office, probably at the time of the transference of the treasury to Athens. It is their views which are reflected in Andoc. 3.38.

appreciation of Thucydides' tendentious purpose would have saved Meiggs much ingenious speculation on the original assessment of 460 talents (1.96.2). Despite its deceptive precision the figure may have no authority, but may have resulted simply from the debate which surrounded the controversial reassessment of 425 (Meiggs-Lewis 69), when the reassessed figure of perhaps exactly 1460 talents was presented by its critics at the time as a round 1000 talents more than that of the just Aristides.⁵ Thucydides is likewise tendentious in his account of the causes of the war in 431, which is clearly designed, especially in its treatment of the Megarian Decree, to defend Pericles and the Athenians against the charge, repeated by Meiggs 200–201, of having precipitated the war.⁶ And Thucydides' views reach such a height of perverse complexity in his defence in the Melian Dialogue of the Athenian action against Melos in 416, treated somewhat obscurely by Meiggs 382–389, that it may well be right and proper for Meiggs to disagree with Thucydides as often as he does.

More serious is Meiggs' disregard of Diodorus' dates. He admits that Diodorus' location of Cimon's Cyprus expedition in 450/49 and 449/8 (12.3–4), i.e., in the campaigning season of 449, comes from Diodorus' chronological source (456). But such a date is incompatible with Meiggs' central reconstruction of the period around 450, in particular with his dating and interpretation of the Papyrus Decree in 450/49. Accordingly Meiggs dismisses Diodorus' dates in general as "arbitrary" (454) and his chronological source in this instance as "not necessarily right" (457), and suggests himself the no less arbitrary date of 451 for the expedition. Three categories of dates are distinguished in Diodorus: (1) those from the chronological source and likely to be right: e.g., accessions (11.69.6, 12.31.1), foundations (12.32.3, 34.5), synoecisms (11.54.1, 13.75.1), and treaties (12.7); (2) those from the chronological source but not necessarily right: e.g., the attribution of events to 459/8 and 458/7 (11.78.1–4, 79.1–3), which is held to be incompatible with the Erechtheid casualty list (Meiggs-Lewis 33); (3) those from Diodorus himself, in complete disregard, for various reasons, of his chronological source: e.g., throughout the 470s (11.38–62). Dates in categories (2) and (3) are respectively

⁵Cf. M. Chambers, "Four Hundred Sixty Talents," *CP* 53 (1958) 31, n. 24.

⁶Meiggs quotes Thuc. 1.23.6 as unambiguous evidence of Thucydides' judgment that the Athenians did in fact precipitate the war. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1972) has shown that such an interpretation of Thuc. 1.23.6 does violence to the whole burden of Thucydides' treatment of the causes of the war. My own view of Thuc. 1.23.6 can be found in *CW* 68 (1974) 179. Meiggs similarly misunderstands Thuc. 1.44.2: ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίου πόλεμος καὶ ὡς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς (sc. the Athenians). This likewise represents rather an attempt by Thucydides to defend the Athenians against the charge of having willfully precipitated the war through alliance with Corcyra.

ignored or rejected and even in category (1) the five years truce is not dated with Diod. 11.86.1 to 454/3 but to 451. The distrust of both Diodorus and his chronological source, coupled with the view that Thucydides criticized Hellanicus' dates in the Pentekontaetia as positively wrong (1.97.2, *τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς*, cf. 456) and yet did not himself in his own treatment of the period observe strict chronological order (111), leaves the reader in intense chronological insecurity. In fact Thucydides' criticism at 1.97.2 is almost certainly directed against Hellanicus' scheme of dating by archon years rather than the rightness of wrongness of particular dates (cf. Jacoby, *FGrHist* 3b [Suppl.] 1.16–19). A comparison of Thucydides' indication of the interval between the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta (1.108.2, *δευτέρα καὶ ἐξηκοστῇ ἡμέρᾳ*) with Diodorus' dating of the first to 458/7 (11.80) and the second to 457/6 (11.81–83) suggests that here Diodorus gives accurately the dates of his chronological source which in its turn accurately preserved the dates of Hellanicus.⁷ Thucydides insists at 1.108.2 that the interval between the two battles was short, a fact important for his main theme in the excursus on Athenian activity and resilience,⁸ but obscured by Hellanicus' location of the two battles in separate archon years. It should thus be possible, by (1) extracting Hellanicus' dates for the Peloponnesian War from Thucydides' account, (2) supposing Diodorus' chronological source to have accurately preserved those dates, (3) establishing from Diodorus' own account of the Peloponnesian War his "system of error" in the use of his chronological source, and (4) taking into account Thucydides' other corrections in his Pentekontaetia excursus on unreal intervals suggested by Hellanicus' scheme (e.g., 1.101.3, 103.1, 105.6, 109.4, 110.1, 112.1, 115.2, 117.1 and 3), to establish a method for the recovery of Hellanicus' dates from Diodorus' account of the Pentekontaetia. Without such a method many dates in any modern account of the Pentekontaetia will be wholly arbitrary. This may not always matter. But that the Peace of Callias not only was historical but took place precisely in 450 is crucial to Meiggs' whole interpretation of the development and character of the Athenian empire. And yet this crucial date remains for him no more than a guess in disregard of the dating by Diodorus and his source to 449/8.

Inscriptions provide more familiar material for chronological controversy. Meiggs' views on the overriding importance of letter forms, especially the three-barred sigma, for establishing dating criteria are

⁷The chronological argument is not affected by the fact that Diodorus at 11.81–83 has mistaken two accounts of the same battle of Oenophyta for two battles; cf. G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* 3.1 (Gotha 1897) 319.

⁸Cf. P. K. Walker, "The Purpose and Method of 'The Pentekontaetia' in Thucydides, Book 1," *CQ* n.s. 7 (1957) 27–38.

well known. Against the relentless criticism of H. B. Mattingly he has maintained the orthodox belief that Athenian public inscriptions with three-barred sigmas must be dated before 445. This position requires acceptance of an interval of more than 20 years between the decision to build a temple to Athena Nike (Meiggs-Lewis 44, lines 11–12 with three-barred sigma) and the temple's actual construction in the 420s, and likewise between the decision to appoint a priestess of Athena Nike at an annual salary of 50 drachmas (Meiggs-Lewis 44, lines 2–5, 8–9) and the specification of the paying authority for this salary in 424/3 (Meiggs-Lewis 71). Meiggs admits (501) that this is at first sight contrary to common sense. But he passes too lightly over an even more serious objection to orthodoxy (115, cf. 517). The Miletus Decree⁹ shows three-barred sigmas and is internally dated in or after¹⁰ the archonship of Euthynus twice mentioned in the body of the text (lines 63 and 88). The only attested archonship of Euthynus is that of 426/5.¹¹ In fact the decree would best fit 406/5 with the prescript (line 3) restored [*Καλλίας ἐρχε*] and the later references to the archonship of Euthynus understood as dating earlier Athenian regulations for Miletus. It will have followed an Athenian recovery of the city in late summer 406 after six years of Spartan control. The Athenians then decided to continue co-operation with the leading families favoured by Alcibiades and the Spartans in 412 (cf. Thuc. 8.17.2). But in spring 405 oligarchs called in the Spartans and violently suppressed the *demos* and its leaders as related in Diodorus 13.104.5–6, where the incident is attracted to the date of the “peg” event, the battle of Aegospotami in 405/4. This prompted comment by the Old Oligarch (ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.11), who may be presumed on other grounds to have been writing in the early summer of 405.¹² The Erythrae Decree (Meiggs-

⁹IG 1² 22 = *ATL* 2, D 11; cf. D. W. Bradeen and M. F. McGregor, *Studies in Fifth-Century Attic Epigraphy* (University of Cincinnati Classical Studies 4, 1973) 24–70.

¹⁰Cf. C. W. Fornara, “The Date of the ‘Regulations for Miletus’,” *AJP* 92 (1971) 473–475.

¹¹Cf. H. B. Mattingly in *ΦΟΡΟΣ*, *Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt* (Locust Valley, N.Y. 1974) 98–101.

¹²Ste Croix, *op. cit.* (above n. 6) 309 prefers not to follow M. J. Fontana, *L’Athenaion Politeia del V secolo a.C.* (Palermo 1968), in believing that the Old Oligarch was writing as late as the last decade of the fifth century. But 1.19–20 might well represent a *post eventum* justification of the unexpectedly successful drafting on board triremes of slaves and citizens thought unaccustomed to rowing before the battle of Arginusae in 406 (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.24 with *Ar. Ran.* 209–268); 2.14–16 would be a fitting description of the Athenian position after the Spartan occupation of Decelea in 413; 3.2, *περὶ νόμων θέσεως*, is likewise most easily understood after the establishment of the process of *νομοθεσία* in 411 and its continuation thereafter (cf. Thuc. 8.97.2, Meiggs-Lewis 86 and C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* [Oxford 1952] 300); and the 400 trierarchs of 3.4 are most easily explicable after the establishment of syntriarchy ca 410, cf. G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* (Munich 1926) 1200, n. 4. In general the pamphlet suggests the same political atmosphere at Athens as that described in Andoc. 1.75 and reflected in *Ar. Ran.* 675–737.

Lewis 40) probably belongs to the same period, and from its opening lines (3–4) can be dated more precisely to the time of the Great Panathenaea of 406. It will have followed a similar Athenian recovery of Erythrae in 406 after the Athenian victory at Arginusae.¹³ So late a date for two decrees with such pronounced “undeveloped” Attic letters at a time of heavy Ionic intrusion¹⁴ would be unacceptable to both Meiggs and Mattingly. But in this tense last decade even political considerations may have played their part at Athens in the lettering of public inscriptions as they did at Thasos, where under the oligarchy Parian letter forms replaced Ionic (cf. Meiggs-Lewis 83 with Meiggs 575). It would not have been surprising at Athens if the nostalgia revealed in concern for the ancestral constitution, Aeschylean morality, and Solonian political wisdom should also have been shown in the letter forms and/or spelling of public inscriptions. Here Atticism may also have been part of an Athenian concern to assert their political identity precisely at this time of heavy Ionian intrusion in all areas. Certainly in the final inscription of the Miletus Decree there seems to have been a late instruction to the mason to replace originally intended Ionic with Attic forms.¹⁵ One even begins to suspect that the decision never again to make public use of Attic letters after the archonship of Euclides (Theopompus *FGrHist* 115F155) may have been something more than a technical directive to masons.

Finally, after reading the recent contributions of C. W. Fornara to Herodotean studies,¹⁶ Meiggs would no doubt (cf. 602) have liked to revise his view that Herodotus had almost nothing to say about the Athenian empire (4–5, 375–376). Indeed if, as the present reviewer believes, those scholars were right who many years ago dated Herodotus

¹³There is much in the language of the decree which recalls the attempt at Athens in the last decade of the fifth century to present *demokratia* as constitutional majority government rather than irresponsible tyranny by the poor. Thus the use of *πλήθος* (lines 21–22) rather than *δῆμος*, with the latter’s pejorative overtones for many critics of *demokratia* (cf. ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.2, etc.), recalls the replacement, or at least ‘glossing’, in other decrees of the last decade, of *δῆμος* by *πόλις* (Meiggs-Lewis 89, lines 33–35, 49, 61–62, cf. 9–10; Meiggs-Lewis 90, lines 8–9; Meiggs-Lewis 91, lines 34–35; cf. Meiggs-Lewis 80, line 11). One is reminded of the repeated phrase *ὁ δῆμος πλεθύνων* in *IG* 1² 114. It seems also significant that in Herodotus’ Constitutional Debate (3.80–83), which I believe was written as late as the end of the fifth century (see below, 252), Otanes, who supports democracy, prefers *πλήθος* to *δῆμος* (3.80.6; 83.2), whereas the opponents of democracy speak of *δῆμος* (3.81.1, 3; 82.4). Similarly the inclusion in the Erythrae Decree of the allies in the oath of loyalty (lines 23–24) and their description as a *χουνμαχία* (line 31) and not *πόλες ἡδὲ Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι* (see above, 246) fits the corresponding Athenian attempt in the last decade, well described by Meiggs 367–369, to present a better image of their empire; cf. Meiggs-Lewis 87, line 19, *τῶν συμμάχων*.

¹⁴Cf. M. B. Walbank in *ΦΟΡΟΣ* (*op. cit.*, above n. 11).

¹⁵Cf. Bradeen and McGregor, *op. cit.* (above n. 9) 31–33.

¹⁶C. W. Fornara, *Herodotus, An Interpretative Essay* (Oxford 1971), with “Evidence for the Date of Herodotus’ Publication,” *JHS* 91 (1971) 25–34.

in the last decade of the fifth century and even later,¹⁷ then contemporary Athens informs every imperialist and expansionist figure in the *Histories* from Croesus¹⁸ through Darius¹⁹ to Xerxes.²⁰ The fates, too, of the Athenians' predecessors in thalassocracy, Minos and Polycrates, bear a strange resemblance to that of the Athenians in Sicily.²¹ The *Histories* seem in fact to constitute a monumental demonstration of Athenian failure as the last turn of history's wheel (cf. Hdt. 1.207.2). By suffering, like Croesus and Xerxes, the Athenians had learnt: in view of the glorious part they had played in the Persian Wars (cf. Hdt. 7.139), their subsequent assumption themselves of the Persian role (cf. Thuc. 6.76.4) should now (i.e., after 404) be forgiven (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19–20).

It is clear, then, that radically different views from those of Meiggs are possible. But Meiggs himself is everywhere aware of this. In the end the book's considerable merit lies not so much in its control and presentation of the staggeringly complex material and argument, but in its author's openness of mind. His index entry "Probably: *passim*" allows his curiosity and example to continue to inspire those grateful students to whom his work is dedicated.

¹⁷See, e.g., H. F. Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici* 2 (Oxford 1834) 79; W. Mure, *A Critical History of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece* 4 (London 1853) 534 f.

¹⁸The essence of Croesus' imperialism is for Herodotus *καταστροφή ἐς φόρον ἀπαγωγῆν* (1.6.2, 27.1), variously effected (1.26.3), with an impressive imperial treasury as its consequence (1.29–33). One is reminded of Thucydides' account of Athens' imperial progress (1.99, 6.76.3) and its consequence (2.13.2–5).

¹⁹The detailed account of Darius' establishment of satrapal divisions for the collection of *phoros* (Hdt. 3.89) may have been intended to recall the districts evident in the quota lists from 443/2 onwards (*ATL* 2, list 12). And the complicated calculation of the total of Persian *phoros* as 14,560 talents (Hdt. 3.95) suggests intended comparison with the ca 1460 talents of the Athenian reassessment of 425 (Meiggs-Lewis 69). If such a comparison was intended, it would explain the precise choice of multiplication factors for the reduction of Babylonian silver talents and Indian gold to Euboic (= Attic) silver talents (Hdt. 3.89, 95) in order to arrive at a Persian total as near as possible to tenfold the reassessed Athenian total.

²⁰The striking similarities between the debate at the Persian court before Xerxes' expedition against Greece (Hdt. 7.5–18) and the debate at Athens before the Athenian expedition against Sicily (Thuc. 6.8–26) were noticed, but misinterpreted, by F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London 1907) 197 f., 201 f. Note also the similarity between the ideology of Persian imperialism (Hdt. 7.8a1, 50.2–3) and that of Athens (Thuc. 1.70.8; 2.63.3; 6.18.6). It is not Thucydides who has cast Athens in the mould of Xerxes, but rather Herodotus who has cast Xerxes in the mould of Athens.

²¹Thucydides in the *Archaeology* (1.1–20) sees history as a succession of thalassocracies with Minos at the beginning (1.4, 8.2) and Polycrates among the immediate predecessors of the Athenians (1.13.6). Herodotus is similarly interested in Minos (1.171.2, 3.122.2) and Polycrates (3.122.2) as thalassocrats. If one disregards Sophocles' undated *Καμικοί*, Herodotus is the first to tell of Minos' death in Sicily (7.170), and he chooses to tell a story of Polycrates' temptation and death (3.123) which oddly resembles Athenian temptation (Thuc. 6.46.3) and disaster.

Schuller's book is very different. Almost all its material is taken from Meiggs and arranged in careful, painstaking order with no suggestion that it might be otherwise. In Part 1 (11–136) chronological problems of imperial development are deliberately ignored in an extensive analysis of a system of imperial control by (1) *direct means*: the imperial fleet, colonies/cleruchies, garrisons, Athenian officials with financial, military, judicial (including law-enforcement), and constitutional authority in allied affairs, structural separation of ally from ally (ship-providers/tribute-payers, ἀποράξῃς) combined with administrative uniformity (*leges generales* such as Meiggs-Lewis 46) and economic pressure; (2) *indirect means*: allied economic, military (e.g., defence against Thracians, Persians, etc.), and class/individual advantage (Athenian support for the class of the many poor, and for individual allied προστάται τοῦ δήμου and πρόξενοι), legal (sanctioned by alliance and loyalty oaths, cf. Meiggs-Lewis 52, lines 21–39), pseudo-colonial (e.g., Meiggs-Lewis 69, lines 55–58), and other religious obligation,²² and more general ideological motivation (cf. Thuc. 2.41.3 with 1.73–75). In Part 2 (139–194) the emergence of the system thus described is placed with Meiggs in the years before and after 450. There is only brief discussion in an appendix, admitted by Schuller himself to be inadequate (211), of E. Erxleben's arguments²³ for a date in the 420s for the Coinage Decree, and remarks such as "Das Dekret (sc. the Miletus Decree) ist durch die Nennung des Archons Euthynos sicher datiert (i.e., in 450/49)" (35, n. 174) are simply misleading. Schuller goes beyond Meiggs in finding the origin of Athenian domination in the leadership requirements of continual military activity in the 470s, 460s, and early 450s, so that the hypothesis of massive failure in Egypt is not necessary to explain the transfer of the treasury to Athens in 454 (172–173). He deals most interestingly with the consequences of Ephialtes' establishment of radical democracy in 462/1: the replacement of individual, well-connected aristocrats at the centre of Athenian foreign policy by the collective *demos* had far-reaching organizational consequences for the systematization of Athenian control (179–181), culminating in the reorganization of 443/2, which Schuller is right to emphasize (62–69, 177) more than Meiggs (187, 243–246).

Schuller's analysis of the system itself is admirably thorough, but unsatisfactory in its brief treatment of ideology. The Athenians' attested conception of themselves as the champions of the many against the few (cf. Thuc. 3.47.2, 82.1; ps.-Xen. *Ath. pol.* 1.4, 14; 3.10) and of Ionians against Dorians (cf. Thuc. 1.95.1, 3.86.3–4, 6.6.1), in short of the op-

²²Cf. J. P. Barron, "Religious Propaganda of the Delian League," *JHS* 84 (1964) 35–48.

²³"Das Münzgesetz des delisch-attischen Seebundes," *ArchP* 19 (1969) 91–139; 20 (1970) 66–132; 21 (1971) 145–162.

pressed against their oppressors (cf. Thuc. 2.40.4; 6.18.2), accords badly with their frequent presentation of themselves, according to Thucydides, as a naturally hated élite justified by their strength alone in their rule over the weak (e.g., 1.76.2; 5.105.2). Schuller (120–122) follows Meiggs (375–396) against H. Strasburger²⁴ in believing that the Athenians openly accepted their enemies' charge that the empire was a tyranny (cf. Thuc. 1.122.3, 124.3), and were prepared as part of their own imperial ideology to justify their actions precisely as tyrannical. This is simply incredible. Of course such an analysis of empire was current among the few intellectuals, including Thucydides himself, influenced by the sophistic view that power constituted its own justification (cf. especially ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.2, 18; 2.20). Accordingly one finds it reflected in Euripides' plays²⁵ and used more or less subtly by Aristophanes (e.g., *Eq.* 1111–1114, *Vesp.* 548–630) to present to his Athenian audience a view of itself which he intended it to find true, but ideologically unacceptable: only if thus confused could the *demos* be made to repent of its assumption of full political power and return to the patronage of its betters.²⁶ But Aristophanes knew to his cost that to go too far in attempting to persuade the poor Athenian majority to see itself as the wealthy few saw it meant not reward for supporting an alternative acceptable ideology, but attack in the popular courts for slandering the *demos* (cf. *Arch.* 502–506, 641–645). The Athenian assembly preferred divine oracles (cf. Thuc. 2.8.2, 21.3; 8.1.1; *Ar. Eq.* 61, 1011–1013; Meiggs-Lewis 52 and 73) and arguments from moral feeling (cf. Thuc. 3.36.4–5) and obligation (cf. Thuc. 6.6.1) to sophistic talk of nature and power. Thucydides' reconstruction of public debate not as it was but as it should have been (1.22.1) in accordance with his own intellectualism²⁷ has immeasurably impaired our understanding of fifth century Athenian political experience. However, both Meiggs (171) and Schuller (120–122) believe that the official language of imperial decrees, especially the formula *πόλες ἡὸν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι* and its variants (cf. Schuller 121, n. 232), proves conclusively that the Athenian *demos* did in fact conceive its of empire as a tyranny. This formula is used to describe territory (Thuc. 5.18.7; [Plut.] *X orat.* 834a; *IG* 1² 56.2, 93.14–15, Meiggs-Lewis 80.22), as well as cities, over which the Athenians have authority to enforce peace (Thuc. 5.47.2), protection (*IG* 1² 27, 28a, 56, 72; *IG* 2² 32, 38, 73), property-rights (Meiggs-Lewis 80, lines 15–17), permission to trade (*IG* 1² 93, 14–16), or prohibition of burial ([Plut.] *X orat.* 834a). It is certainly the language of control, but

²⁴"Thukydides und die politische Selbstdarstellung der Athener," *Hermes* 86 (1958) 17–40.

²⁵Cf. J. H. Finley, *Three Essays in Thucydides* (Harvard University Press, 1967) 1–54.

²⁶Cf. Ste Croix, *op. cit.* (above, n. 6), Appendix 29.

²⁷Cf. Chr. Schneider, *Information und Absicht bei Thukydides*, Hypomnemata 41.

not contextually of brutal control. Schuller goes too far in his comment (123, n. 233): "Mir scheint die *brutale* Benennung der Städte als Städte, über die die Athener *Gewalt* ausübten, zu beweisen, dass die Athener hochoffiziell sich inhaltlich derselben Sprache bedienten, wie sie Thukydides in seinen Reden darstellt" (my italics).

In the central question of the empire's development Schuller is right to insist upon the importance of the 462/1 revolution, but wrong to see its consequences as essentially administrative and not political. Ephialtes' establishment in 462/1 of the Athenian *demos* as a sovereign body enjoying political without economic equality created the basis for subsequent imperialism. At first the Athenian poor used their new political power to secure the indirect redistribution of the wealth of the allied rich, *via* the systematized payment of *phoros* and the confiscation of land, to themselves in the form of cleruchies and regular pay for work on public building, political office and, most importantly, service in the imperial fleet. Their own rich, such as Pericles and his supporters among the landed aristocracy, encouraged this movement, indeed did much to create its nationalist ideology, in defence of traditional property rights in Attica. The outbreak of war in 431, with the consequential destruction of property in Attica and the imposition for the first time upon the Athenian rich of *εἰσφορά*, alienated the Athenian landed class, including the small farmers, from the militancy of the landless poor and their new leaders. The war rapidly developed into a revolutionary conflict throughout the Aegean between the landless poor, whose economic interest lay in the continuation of war, and the landed class, who wanted peace. The Athenian landless majority, its numbers increased by impoverished small farmers, was now obliged further to centralize and for the first time to militarize its imperial system against the enemy from both without and within. Hence the *leges generales* of the period (e.g., Meiggs-Lewis 45, 46 and 68; cf. Meiggs-Lewis 52, line 76), the widespread appearance of Athenian *archontes* in the allied cities (e.g., Meiggs-Lewis 46, line 6, etc.), and the militant tone of the Reassessment Decree (Meiggs-Lewis 69). The Peace of Nicias in 421 inaugurated a lull in the class struggle and concomitant retrenchment in public expenditure.²⁸ In the end the unsatisfied demands of the Athenian and allied poor for continued employment in the imperial fleet led to the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.24.3; cf. 7.63.3). Soon afterwards, however, the occupation of Decelea in 413, followed by Athenian failure in Sicily and the outbreak of the Ionian War, recreated in a more acute form the revolutionary conditions of the Archidamian War. A radical attempt in 411 by men regarded by Thucydides as among the most able and perceptive of the time (Thuc. 8.68)

²⁸Cf. Meiggs-Lewis 58B, lines 12–19 with C. W. Fornara, "The Date of the Callias Decrees," *GRBS* 11 (1970) 185–196.

to isolate the economically revolutionary force of the landless in the fleet from its destructive political base in the landed *polis* by effectual disfranchisement at Athens and elsewhere (cf. Thuc. 8.64.1) failed. The years which followed were characterized by intense instability. The effort to preserve the landed *polis* from destruction by the landless *demos* produced a concern in public language for the terminology of πόλις, πλῆθος (see above, n. 13), and τὸ κοινόν (cf. Meiggs-Lewis 89, line 53: [μέτ]ε ὑπὸ ιδίῳ μέτε ὑπὸ κοινῷ πόλεος) rather than δῆμος, and a concomitant attempt in the activity of νομοθεταί (see above, n. 12) to define, and assert the sovereignty of, νόμος (cf. the cynical comment of ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.18). This was reflected in the language and practice of empire, with a new insistence on an autonomous alliance (cf. Meiggs-Lewis 87) based on the straightforward principle of majority rule (cf. Meiggs-Lewis 40). However, the instability of the situation was shown in the brief tyranny of Alcibiades in 407 and the tragically confused self-assertion of the *demos* at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae in 406 (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.8–35, esp. 12). Finally, if belatedly, after the battle of Aegospotami in 405 the Athenian *demos* recognized that its revolution was incompatible with the survival of the traditional concept of the *polis* and gave its citizenship to the loyal Samians (Meiggs-Lewis 94). The movement of the social revolution beyond nationalism was at last, if only fleetingly, complete.

Schuller's analysis is very different. He argues that war was such a persistent phenomenon throughout the fifth century (6–7, 162) that the Peloponnesian War made no significant difference to the nature of Athenian imperialism. Thucydides, and one suspects all of his contemporaries, thought otherwise. W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens* (Princeton 1971), has recently demonstrated clearly the profound change that took place in Athenian political life ca 430, and Mattingly's interpretation of the inscriptional evidence has shown the effect of that change on the workings of the imperial system. Most significantly Schuller will not acknowledge the essential, however complex, connection within Athens itself between imperialism and class struggle. Accordingly not the poor Athenian majority but rather "Athens", like some Machiavellian prince (or indeed like Darius through Mardonius at Hdt. 6.43.3), establishes in the allied cities poor majority governments as an instrument not of class struggle, but of imperial control (82–98, 202–203, 208). Supporters of "Athens" and leaders of the poor in the allied cities are guaranteed protection by "Athens" not against their own rich but against their own poor whom they "betray to Athens" (99–100, 132–133).

A proper evaluation of the complex problem of the interconnection between class struggle, imperialism, and the breakdown of the *polis* in the fifth century requires a respect for chronology. The fact is that if the

fully developed system of Athenian intervention in the allied states with *episkopoi*, resident garrisons, and heavily protected *proxenoi* really did emerge, as Meiggs and Schuller believe, a full generation before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the occurrence of generalized *stasis* (cf. Thuc. 3.82.1), then Schuller must be judged right in his presentation of the Athenians as "social imperialists" (my term, not Schuller's). The question is clearly an important one. M. I. Finley once criticized historians of the Athenian empire for ignoring serious questions of democracy and imperialism and preferring instead a trivial controversy concerning three-barred and four-barred sigmas (*Times Lit. Suppl.* 7.4.66, p. 289). Meiggs was right in every way to insist that any treatment of the Athenian empire which ignores this controversy should have no authority (*op. cit.* [above, n. 1] 98).

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